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The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions.  
How International Cooperation Enhances the Autonomy of Competition 
Authorities 
ABSTRACT 
As a result of international legalization, the potential for conflicts of overlapping juris-
dictions has multiplied – vertically between national and international law, as well as 
horizontally between national and foreign law. In competition control, the latter type of 
horizontal overlap between US and EU jurisdictions is significant, but very few con-
flicts actually occur. Rather than solving the underlying issue of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, US and EU competition authorities have established a practice of cooperation 
which aims at preventing conflicts in the first place. Moreover, apart from conflict pre-
vention, transatlantic cooperation significantly enhances the autonomy of competition 
authorities vis-à-vis politics, judges, and firms. 
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The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions  
How International Cooperation Enhances the Autonomy of Competition 
Authorities 
INTRODUCTION1 
International legalization, rather than substituting international for national law, creates 
a multiplicity of legal orders. As a result, conflicts of overlapping jurisdictions may oc-
cur vertically, between national and international law, as well as horizontally, between 
different national legal orders. The latter type of horizontal overlap is prominent in 
competition control where international legalization is characterized only marginally by 
the emergence of new international rules, but by an expanding reach of already existing 
national and European law beyond traditional territorial borders.  
A number of high profile conflicts of horizontally overlapping jurisdictions between 
US and EU competition authorities have attracted intense scholarly interest during the 
past decade – e.g. the merger cases GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas or 
the antitrust investigations against Microsoft (cf. Damro 2001; Chun 2002; Morgan and 
McGuire 2004; Grant and Neven 2005; Fox 2007). Most prominently, the emergence of 
conflicts is explained by different traditions of competition policy and divergent indus-
trial policy goals. Given these differences and the broad jurisdiction of both US and EU 
competition authorities, however, we should be much more astonished that there are so 
few conflicts. Typically, transgovernmental networks that exchange information, coop-
erate in enforcement and prepare regulatory convergence are referred to in order to ex-
plain how conflicts are moderated or prevented (Friedberg 1990; Devuyst 2001; 
Raustiala 2002; Mehta 2003; Slaughter 2004: 174f.; Damro 2006b). Yet these explana-
tions tend to neglect the political implications of international cooperation between 
competition authorities and their governance of overlapping jurisdictions.  
International cooperation, this paper argues, significantly enhances the autonomy of 
EU and US competition authorities. If cooperation fails and competition authorities 
clash over individual cases, they become susceptible to external influence. Then, gov-
ernments may try to intervene; firms can choose forums; and judges get the ultimate say 
in cases of conflict. By contrast, transgovernmental networking makes competition au-
thorities institutionally more independent and allows them to privilege more clearly 
undistorted competition over other policy goals. 
The argument will be developed in four steps: First, the general challenge of over-
lapping jurisdictions is described and the political implications of different strategies to 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Markus Krajewski, Tilman Krüger, Susanne K. Schmidt and two anonymous referees for 
their helpful comments on this paper.   
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deal with overlapping jurisdictions are emphasized. Subsequently, the field of competi-
tion policy is introduced and existing explanations of conflicts and cooperation between 
US and EU authorities are discussed. The main argument on the autonomy of competi-
tion authorities vis-à-vis politicians, judges and firms is elaborated in the following 
chapter. The conclusion summarizes the main findings of the paper and outlines routes 
for further research. 
THE GOVERNANCE OF OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS 
International legalization loosens the traditional link between territory and law 
(Raustiala 2006). While nation states are still defined along territorial borders, law is 
increasingly international or regional (e.g. European). International and European law 
hardly ever replace domestic law, but they add additional legal layers which overlap 
and, therefore, potentially conflict with domestic law (Zürn and Leibfried 2005: 21f.). 
Moreover, the rise of global and regional transborder activities also involves an in-
creased interpenetration of domestic and foreign legal orders.  
We may, thus, distinguish two basic types of overlapping jurisdictions that may lead 
to conflicts between legal orders. Vertical conflicts arise between different levels of 
jurisdiction, i.e. between domestic, regional and international law. Horizontal conflicts 
emerge between different domestic legal orders. Going beyond this distinction, some 
authors note that vertical conflicts may also involve controversies across legal sectors – 
e.g. if international trade law clashes with domestic environmental regulation – and, 
therefore, propose to speak of diagonal conflicts (Joerges 2007: 8). Furthermore, hori-
zontal conflicts can also occur on a purely international level, i.e. between different in-
ternational regimes (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004). 
Table 1: Strategies to govern overlapping jurisdictions 
 vertical horizontal 
conflict solution supremacy, 
sovereignty 
mutual recognition,  
extraterritoriality, 
negative comity 
conflict prevention harmonization, 
‘vertical’ convergence 
transgovernmental networks, 
‘horizontal’ convergence 
positive comity 
 
As to the available strategies to govern overlapping jurisdictions, we can draw a line – 
albeit not always a very clear one – between solving conflicts and preventing them in 
the first place. While a strategy of conflict resolution seeks to settle the question of 
which law should apply, a strategy of conflict prevention seeks to render the same ques-
tion more or less irrelevant. Vertical conflicts can be solved centrally, e.g. by establish-
ing a doctrine of supremacy, or decentralized, based on a traditional understanding of 
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territorial sovereignty. Harmonization or convergence towards a higher level model 
renders conflicts less likely as different legal orders produce similar results. Horizontal 
conflicts can be solved by mutual recognition between different domestic legal orders or 
by clearly circumscribing the reach of extraterritoriality. Convergence between different 
domestic legal orders and cooperation in transgovernmental networks may help to pre-
vent horizontal conflicts in the first place. For example, according to the principle of 
positive comity, a governmental agency rather than enforcing its own law extraterritori-
ally may request a foreign agency to get active on its behalf (Slaughter 2004: 250-253).  
The questions of how to solve or to prevent conflicts between overlapping jurisdic-
tions are of fundamental importance for any political system as they touch upon the ba-
sic distribution of regulatory competences. However, these issues are mostly debated by 
legal scholars or economists, while political science often remains silent. The ‘constitu-
tionalization’ of European law, for example, has mainly been an invention of European 
lawyers (Weiler 1991), and the principle of mutual recognition is often overlooked in 
contributions about European governance (Schmidt 2007). Debates on the ‘pluralism’ or 
the ‘fragmentation’ of international law are largely confined to legal circles (cf. Walker 
2008; Koskenniemi and Leino 2002). Scholars of law and economics treat issues of 
overlapping jurisdictions mainly as a matter of (in)efficient allocation of competences 
and, therefore, ask for ways to reduce transaction costs and try to identify the optimum 
regulatory level (Trachtman 2001; Budzinski 2008). In contrast, a political science ap-
proach needs to ask for the actors that have an interest in a particular strategy to deal 
with overlapping jurisdictions and for the implications of this strategy concerning the 
policy goals at issue as well as regards the distribution of competences (cf. Budzinski 
and Christiansen 2005).  
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS IN COMPETITION CONTROL  
Competition control lends itself to investigate overlapping jurisdictions probably better 
than any other policy field. As the next subsection will show, we find a long history and 
a great variety of horizontal, vertical and diagonal overlaps between different jurisdic-
tions in competition control. At the same time, we only find a surprisingly low number 
of conflicts emerging from these overlaps. As will be shown subsequently, existing ex-
planations do not sufficiently account for the political implications of this observation. 
Conflicts about extraterritorial competition control 
In the field of competition policy, we can observe all of the different types of judicial 
overlap described above. Within the EU, competition control is hierarchically organ-
ized. The European Commission is the central authority in a system of largely decen-
tralized competition enforcement through national competition agencies (Wilks 2005). 
Beyond the European context, no comparable system of international competition con-
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trol has been established so far. Although the idea to create a global competition regime 
dates back to the Havana Charter of 1947 (Wigger 2005: 6f.), competition control re-
mains the joint task of horizontally overlapping national and European competition re-
gimes. Finally, competition control inherently cuts across many other policy areas such 
as trade or industrial policy (Bourgeois and Demaret 1995) and may thus trigger sec-
toral or ‘diagonal’ conflicts. In the following, the paper focuses on global competition 
control and, therefore, excludes intra-European conflicts between jurisdictions.  
Given that no global regime has been established so far, the history of international 
competition control is mainly one of extraterritorial application of US and, more re-
cently, EU competition rules. The basic justification for the extraterritorial application 
of domestic law was developed by an US Court of Appeals in its 1945 Alcoa judge-
ment2. According to the so-called ‘effects doctrine’, jurisdiction can be exerted if a cer-
tain anticompetitive practice has an intended effect on the US market, even if the prac-
tice is located outside the US (cf. Raustiala 2006: 229). In their follow-up judgements, 
many US courts have tried to specify the criteria of ‘intent’ and/or ‘effect’ in order to 
determine the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction (Dlouhy 2003: 69-73). One of the 
most elaborate tests for the effects doctrine was developed in the Timberlane I-III 
judgements3. The Timberlane test proposes a three-stage approach to establish extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction: first, there needs to be ‘some effect – actual or intended’ – on the 
US market; second, it has to be shown that this effect ‘is sufficiently large to present a 
recognizable injury to the plaintiff’; and, third, extraterritorial jurisdiction should only 
be asserted if the interests of the US are ‘sufficiently strong vis-à-vis those of other na-
tions’. Particularly the last criterion was meant as a self-restriction against a too expan-
sionist extraterritorial application of US competition law. In Hartford Fire4, however, 
the US Supreme Court rejected any such comity considerations, unless in situations of 
‘true conflict’, i.e. in cases in which foreign law requires a firm to act in a way that does 
not comply with US competition law (Dlouhy 2003: 164). Lastly, in 2004, the US Su-
preme Court restricted the reach of extraterritoriality in the Empagram case5 and argued 
against an ‘unreasonable interference with foreign jurisdictions’. In brief, the Court 
based its judgment on the US Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) of 
                                                 
2  United States v. Aluminium Co. of America 148 F. 2d 416 (1945) – “Alcoa”. 
3  Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A. 549 F. 2d 597 (1976) – „Timberlane I“; Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass`n 574 F. Supp. 1453 (1983) – „Timberlane II“; Timber-
lane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass`n 749 F. 2d 1378 (1984) – „Timberlane III“. 
4  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California 509 U.S. 764 (1993) – “Hartford Fire”. 
5  Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) – „Empagran“. 
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1982 and rejected the damages claims of a group of foreign firms against an interna-
tional vitamins cartel for injuries suffered outside US territory (cf. Buxbaum 2004).  
In the EU, Treaty rules on competition do not explicitly address the issue of extrater-
ritoriality and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has never officially endorsed the 
American effects doctrine – yet, the alternative ‘economic entity’ and ‘implementation 
doctrines’ developed by the ECJ have led to very similar conclusions in practice (Fried-
berg 1990). The ‘economic entity doctrine’ was established in the ECJ’s Dyestuffs 
judgement6 in 1972. The Court ruled that a non-EC enterprise can be held liable for 
anticompetitive practices of its subsidiary located in the EC, if the parent enterprise ex-
ercised control over its subsidiary and, therefore, both constituted a ‘single economic 
entity’ (Geradin et al. 2008: 4f.). The ‘implementation doctrine’ developed by the ECJ 
in Woodpulp7 goes even further as it includes also cases of purely non-European enter-
prises. According to this doctrine, European competition rules can be applied in cases in 
which anticompetitive practices are actually ‘implemented’ on EU territory, regardless 
of where and by whom these practices were agreed upon. Finally, the ‘effects doctrine’ 
has been referred to by the Commission and various Advocate-Generals (Geradin et al. 
2008: 6), but it took until 1999 for the Court of First Instance (CFI) to officially endorse 
the doctrine in its Gencor judgement.8 The case concerned the European Commission’s 
decision to prohibit the merger of South African Gencor Ltd. and British Lonrho Plc. 
The CFI ruled that the Commission was entitled to apply the EC Merger Regulation as 
the proposed merger would have had an ‘immediate and substantial effect in the Com-
munity’.  
In sum, both US and EU authorities apply their competition laws extraterritorially 
and courts have developed logically distinct, but practically quite similar doctrines for 
justification. In the context of global competition policy, the EU acts as a state-like 
player and some commentators argue that European extraterritorial jurisdiction has be-
come even more expansive than US extraterritoriality (cf. Dlouhy 2003: 140f.; Chun 
2002: 74). Undoubtedly, there is potential for conflicts of horizontally overlapping ju-
risdictions and during the past decades several high profile conflicts between US and 
EU authorities emerged, mainly in the field of merger control (see Table 2). For exam-
ple, when the EU threatened to prohibit the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, 
the US Senate signalled fierce resistance: “Free and fair trade is a cornerstone of our 
                                                 
6  European Court of Justice, Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Limited v. Commission [1972] E.C.R. 619 – 
“Dyestuffs”. 
7  European Court of Justice, Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85. A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and 
others v Commission [1988] E.C.R. 5193 – “Woodpulp”. 
8  Court of First Instance, Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, [1999] E.C.R. II-753 – “Gencor”. 
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relations with Europe, but the EU’s threatened actions contribute little to either and we 
ought to resist them. Their demands in this case are clearly unreasonable and an in-
fringement upon US sovereignty” (cited in Dlouhy 2003: 23). Similarly, when the 
European Commission prohibited the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001, US Treasury Sec-
retary Paul O’Neil blamed it for being “the closest thing you can find to an autocratic 
organization that can successfully impose their will on things that one would think are 
outside their scope of attention” (cited in Fox 2007: 331f.). 
Table 2: Horizontal conflicts between US and EU competition authorities  
Case Year Field 
Dyestuffs  1972 Cartel 
IBM 1985 Abuse of dominant position 
Wood Pulp 1988 Cartel 
De Havilland/Alenia-Aerospatiale 1991 Merger 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 1997 Merger 
Air Liquide/BOC 1999 Merger 
General Electric/Honeywell 2001 Merger 
Microsoft 2004 Abuse of dominant position 
Adopted from Budzinski 2008: 46f.  
All of the listed conflicts have attracted intense public and scientific attention. Obvi-
ously, most of these cases were politically highly salient and some of them led to land-
mark decisions in terms of legal doctrine – but are they typical and, thus, do they consti-
tute good examples to understand more generally the governance of overlapping juris-
dictions in international competition control?  
Some authors argue that, in fact, these cases are ‘atypical’ (Devuyst 2001: 142f.) and 
result from ‘flaws’ in economic analysis and bilateral cooperation (Damro and Guay 
2009). In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, for example, competition authorities still lacked 
the necessary experience in transatlantic cooperation and, therefore, rather than seeking 
early and informal consultations, US authorities mistakenly tried to increase public 
pressure on the European Commission (ibid.: 19). Moreover, it took very long for Boe-
ing to realize that it could not simply ignore the Commission’s demands without risking 
the prohibition of the merger; as such, Boeing’s behaviour contributed to an aggravation 
of the conflict (Devuyst 2001: 144). Similarly, General Electric publicly pressured the 
European Commission for a quick decision which made transatlantic cooperation diffi-
cult and turned out to be counterproductive to the firms’ interest (Damro and Guay 
2009: 29f.). Also, Damro (2001) has put forward an explanation of transatlantic con-
flict, which emphasizes the political-strategic considerations of the European Commis-
sion. By exercising extraterritorial competition control against strong US businesses, the 
Commission could “enhance its credibility in the eyes of the member states” as well as 
“in the eyes of non-Union third parties” (ibid. 217). Yet, this strategy of conflict was 
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only possible due to the very particular features of the case in which both, the US gov-
ernment and Boeing had a strong interest in compromising with the Commission and to 
ensure a quick positive decision (ibid. 218).  
In contrast, other authors regard the conflicts mentioned to indicate more systemic 
“transatlantic divergence” (Morgan and McGuire 2004). First, US and EU competition 
authorities are seen to traditionally differ on their policy goals: “We protect competi-
tion, you protect competitors” (Fox 2003). According to this criticism, EU competition 
control is overly strict in cases of market concentration and tends to neglect efficiency 
gains and pro-competitive effects resulting from economies of scale (Chun 2002: 65; 
Fox 2003: 160; Niels and ten Kate 2004: 12). Secondly, and linked to the first argu-
ment, EU competition control is (or was) said to lack appropriate economic analysis 
(Morgan and McGuire 2004: 45-50). Modernization efforts in European antitrust since 
2004 are interpreted as a reaction to this criticism and a move towards the US approach 
(Fox 2007: 359; Wigger and Nölke 2007). Finally, Klodt (2001: 880) takes the Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas case and other examples to argue that opposed industrial policy 
goals are at the heart of transatlantic conflicts in competition control and strongly advo-
cates an harmonization of international competition rules.  
Cooperation and convergence  
If the latter set of explanations on systematically divergent competition approaches and 
on the lack of international harmonization was right, however, we should rather be sur-
prised of the low number of conflicts between US and EU competition authorities (cf. 
Parisi 1999: 133; Devuyst 2001: 142). Since the adoption of the EC Merger Regulation 
in 1989, a total number of 4015 merger cases have been notified to the European Com-
mission of which hundreds involved non-EU enterprises.9 For example, in 2001 – the 
year of the GE/Honeywell conflict –, the Commission contacted US authorities in 84 
cases under investigation (see Table 3). From 1992 until 2005, 1355 cases – to a large 
part merger cases – were dealt with bilaterally between the European Commission and 
the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and/or the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In 
at least 75 cases between 1993 and 2004, competition authorities from the US and the 
EU both took final decisions (Lévêque 2007: 4). In its annual reports on competition 
policy and the Competition Policy Newsletter, the European Commission regularly in-
forms about cases in which EU and US competition authorities synchronized their en-
forcement activities and reached congruent final decisions.10  
                                                 
9  For a quick statistical overview of merger cases investigated by the Commission, see: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/mergers/statistics.pdf [last checked on 17 July 2009].  
10  Each annual report on competition policy contains one subsection on international activities and typically gives 
some details on cases which were dealt with bilaterally, see e.g. European Commission (2008: 147).  
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Table 3: Case notifications between EU and US competition authorities11  
Year 
EC → US US → EC Sum 
Total Mergers Total Mergers Total Mergers 
1992 26 11 40 31 66 42 
1993 44 20 40 20 84 40 
1994 29 18 35 20 64 38 
1995 42 31 35 18 77 49 
1996 48 35 38 27 86 62 
1997 42 30 36 20 78 50 
1998 52 43 46 39 98 82 
1999 70 59 49 39 119 98 
2000 104 85 58 49 162 134 
2001 84 71 37 25 121 96 
2002 63 56 44 27 107 73 
2003 56 * 46 * 102 * 
2004 54 * 28 * 82 * 
2005 82 * 27 * 109 * 
Total 796 459* 559 315* 1355 764* 
* Missing data  
The figures already indicate that intense cooperation between EU and US competition 
authorities exists. Most notably, case notifications are not about determining who has 
the ultimate say in a particular case (Parisi 1999: 137), but about mutually informing 
each other at an early stage about potential parallel investigations. Thus, cooperation 
between competition authorities mainly aims at preventing conflicts between overlap-
ping jurisdictions rather than at dissolving the overlap itself (cf. Damro 2006a: 100f., 
113f.).  
In several bilateral agreements, the European Commission and the US government 
have institutionalised their cooperation in competition control since the early 1990s. 
Following an initiative of competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, the European 
Commission and US competition authorities (DoJ and FTC) concluded their first bilat-
eral agreement in 1991: the EU/US Competition Cooperation Agreement (Devuyst 
2001: 134-136).12 The agreement obliges competition authorities to mutually notify in-
vestigations that ‘may affect important interests of the other Party’ (Article II). Fur-
                                                 
11  Based on the Commission’s annual reports to the Council and the European Parliament on its bilateral coopera-
tion in competition policy [COM(2000)618, COM(2002)45, COM(2002)505, COM(2003)500] and on the Annual 
Reports on Competition Policy 2003 to 2005. Unfortunately, the most recent reports do not mention the number 
of notifications and the Commission could not provide the data upon request.  
12  O.J., L 95/47 (1995). For an overview on the different bilateral agreements, see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
international/bilateral/usa.html [last checked: 21.07.2009]. 
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thermore, it establishes regular contacts for the exchange of non-confidential informa-
tion (Article III) and it strengthens enforcement cooperation and coordination (Article 
IV). The 1991 agreement explicitly refers to ‘negative comity’, i.e. to taking into ac-
count the ‘important interests’ of the other party when investigating or deciding a par-
ticular case (Article IV), but it also implicitly establishes a possibility for positive com-
ity, as one party may request the other to investigate a particular case and to enforce 
competition (Article V).  
The latter principle has been regulated in more detail in the 1998 EU/US Positive 
Comity Agreement (Devuyst 2001: 136).13 If an anticompetitive practice does not have 
‘a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the Requesting 
Party's territory’ or if ‘anti-competitive activities (…) occur principally in and are di-
rected principally towards the other Party's territory’ (Article IV), the agreement sug-
gests that a case should be entirely deferred to the competition authority of the Re-
quested Party. In 1999, a supplement to the existing agreements was concluded between 
US and EU competition authorities in order to allow officials from both sides to recip-
rocally attend hearings with involved enterprises during the investigation and decision-
making stages – the so-called Administrative Arrangements on Attendance in Hearings 
(AAA). Last but not least, an informal transatlantic Merger Working Group was estab-
lished by US and EU competition authorities to identify potential areas of convergence 
in merger control (Damro 2006a: 133-138). In 2002, the Working Group issued non-
binding best practice guidelines on cooperation in merger cases which, again, clearly 
emphasize the goal of conflict prevention rather than solution:  
“In today’s global economy, many sizeable transactions involving international 
businesses are likely to be subject to review by the EU and by the US. Where the 
US and EU are reviewing the same transaction, both jurisdictions have an inter-
est in reaching, insofar as possible, consistent, or at least non-conflicting, out-
comes. Divergent approaches to assessment of the likely impact on competition 
of the same transaction undermine public confidence in the merger review proc-
ess, risk imposing inconsistent requirements on the firms involved, and may frus-
trate the agencies’ respective remedial objectives.”14  
In the theoretical debate on international governance and cooperation, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter (2004: Ch. 5) has received broad attention for her argument that transgovern-
mental networks enhance global governance effectiveness. She distinguishes between 
information, enforcement and harmonization networks. Most theoretical accounts of 
transatlantic competition cooperation fit very well with Slaughter’s overall framework. 
                                                 
13  O. J. L 173/28 (1998). Merger cases are excluded from this agreement. 
14  See online: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/eu_us.pdf [last checked: 21.07.2009]. 
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“Distilling and disseminating credible information” (ibid.: 177), i.e. exchange of infor-
mation between agencies helps to “avoid unnecessary duplication of work and costs, 
both for the competition authorities involved and for the businesses whose conduct is 
subject to review” (Devuyst 2001: 132). Moreover, if firms under investigation are 
seated abroad, competition authorities crucially depend on information collected by 
their foreign counterparts. As a premise, confidential business information is excluded 
from information exchange – but, in order to facilitate swift investigations and to lower 
transaction costs, businesses may choose to partly waive their confidentiality rights and 
to allow different competition authorities access to information that has been submitted 
to one of them (Parisi 1999: 138f.). 
“Improving compliance” is another virtue that Slaughter (2004: 183) ascribes to 
transgovernmental networks. As has been shown by various authors (cf. Budzinski 
2008: Ch. 2; Klodt 2005: Ch. 2), globalization goes along with a drastic increase in in-
ternational anticompetitive practices and transnational mergers. Cooperation between 
US and EU competition authorities, therefore, has to be seen as a reaction to economic 
internationalization in order to ensure enforcement of competition rules (Damro 2006b). 
Moreover, by synchronizing their investigations and by reaching congruent decisions, 
competition authorities increase the predictability of competition control and make 
compliance with demands from different jurisdictions easier (Devuyst 2001: 132).  
Finally, network cooperation in individual competition cases may help to create 
“convergence and informed divergence” (Slaughter 2004: 171). In the short run, of 
course, “voluntary cooperation does not immediately lead to a perception by competi-
tion authorities to adopt the same or similar laws and procedures” (Wigger 2005: 13). 
Nevertheless, we can observe various signs for a convergence trend between US and 
EU competition control. Friedberg (1990) was one of the first to argue that US and EU 
visions of extraterritorial jurisdiction were approaching each other. As has already been 
mentioned, the EU modernization efforts since 2003, e.g. the appointment of a Chief 
Competition Economist and the introduction of more refined economic analysis, were 
largely interpreted as a move towards established US practice (Fox 2007: 359; Röller 
and Buigues 2005). The Merger Working Group’s best practice guidelines are probably 
the most obvious example of a soft harmonization between US and EU competition 
regimes (Damro 2006a: 133-138). 
To summarize, the field of competition policy is not only a master example of over-
lapping jurisdictions – it also exhibits one of the most developed systems of interna-
tional, mainly bilateral, cooperation. While cooperation in transgovernmental networks 
does not resolve the underlying issue of overlapping jurisdictions, it is largely success-
ful in preventing jurisdictional conflicts between US and EU competition authorities. 
Jurisdictional conflict is an exception, not the rule. Still, international competition con-
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trol is more than “just an exercise in the reduction of transaction costs (…) Competition 
law has potent historical, economic, political, and social roots that make it a market na-
tion’s ultimate form of public law” (Waller 1997: 395). Taking this reminder seriously, 
the next section discusses the political implications of transatlantic competition coop-
eration.  
AUTONOMY THROUGH COMPETITION POLICY COOPERATION 
The rise of networks, Raustiala argues “is aided by the perception that many regulatory 
issues are technocratic” (2002: 24). This perception seems to be largely reaffirmed by 
the above-cited accounts of transgovernmental cooperation between US and EU compe-
tition authorities. Cooperation in competition control helps to overcome information 
deficits, to prevent duplication of work, to improve legal certainty and to gradually 
harmonize competition rules and practices (cf. Whytock 2005: 51). 
Nevertheless, transatlantic cooperation between competition authorities is not politi-
cally neutral. In the following, it will be argued that cooperation significantly enhances 
the independence of competition authorities from other institutions and it increases their 
autonomy to pursue undistorted competition vis-à-vis other policy goals. This aspect of 
autonomy was essential when Keohane and Nye (1974: 42, 46f.) first wrote about trans-
governmental relations and the incentives for sub-units of government to engage in 
transgovernmental coalitions. Accordingly, conflict prevention between EU and US 
competition authorities has to be interpreted also as a means to increase agency auton-
omy and to forestall external intervention by politicians, judges, and firms.  
Autonomy from politics 
EU competition control operates in a politically complex environment (cf. Cini and 
McGowan 2009: 150-161). The Commission acts as the agent of EU Member states and 
its decisions may be challenged by Member states or interested third parties in the 
European Courts. Moreover, the Commission itself cannot be regarded as a unitary ac-
tor, comparable to an independent competition agency, but it is divided into different 
Directorates-General, each with its own policy priorities. Still, competition decisions 
have to be taken collectively by the College of Commissioners. Critics of the latter as-
pect, mainly from the German competition agency (Bundeskartellamt), have been – so 
far unsuccessfully – demanding the establishment of an independent European Cartel 
Office (Wilks and McGowan 1995: 265). 
In terms of policy goals, competition policy touches upon a broad variety of other 
economic policies such as single market integration, industrial policy, trade policy, and 
regional policy (Buigues et al. 1995; Välilä 2008; Blauberger 2009: 723). Market con-
centration, for example, may be desirable from an industrial policy perspective, if larger 
enterprises invest relatively more in research and development, but it could still be un-
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desirable in terms of free competition (Gual 1995: 19). Conversely, strict competition 
control of domestic firms might be considered disadvantageous for reasons of strategic 
trade policy (Brander and Spencer 1985). Finally, European Treaty rules on cartels and 
the Council regulation on mergers explicitly provide certain exemptions justified with 
reference to public concerns such as “technical and/or economic progress”.15 Thus, 
European competition control under the leadership of the Commission’s Directorate-
General for Competition (DG COMP) always needs to be cautious to consider other 
Directorate-Generals, EU Member states and their respective policy preferences.16  
The development of bilateral competition agreements17 with US authorities provides 
telling examples of the Commission’s attempts to increase its autonomy from Member 
states through transatlantic cooperation. In order to bypass the requirements of EU 
Member state ratification and US congressional approval, EU and US competition au-
thorities initially decided in early 1991 to negotiate an executive agreement rather than 
an international treaty (Damro 2006a: 100-105; 2006b). Negotiations between the com-
petition authorities proceeded quickly and the bilateral agreement was signed by the end 
of 1991. Only shortly after this, however, the French government sued the Commission 
for breaching its competences when entering into an international agreement without 
Council approval. The ECJ confirmed the French position and declared the agreement 
void.18 However, although the ECJ’s judgement constrained the Commission not to con-
clude international agreements without Council approval (Waller 1997: 382), the sub-
stance of the agreement remained unaltered and finally passed the Council in 1995 
(Damro 2006a: 111-113). Moreover, subsequent harmonization measures between US 
                                                 
15  Article 81(3) TEC and Article 2(1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (‘Merger Regulation’).  
16  As regards policy objectives other than competition, US competition authorities and the judges that ultimately 
decide are traditionally more restricted than the multi-faceted European Commission. The pursuit of policy goals 
beyond competition is left to the legislature: “American antitrust law is applied with a peculiar set of blinders de-
signed to prevent the consideration of any factor outside the narrow question of whether an agreement or practice 
unduly restricts competition (…) The U.S. approach is premised on the preservation and enhancement of compe-
tition as the paramount and overriding goal of the antitrust laws to be applied by the courts, while an active Con-
gress stands ready to pass subsequent specific statutes when it wishes to achieve some other result or promote a 
different social or policy goal. Such compartmentalization reflects basic separation of powers notions fundamen-
tal to the United States” (Waller 1994: 586f.). US resistance against an international harmonization of antitrust 
rules can partly be explained by competition officials’ concerns that this separation might be undermined, e.g. 
through inclusion of trade issues in competition control (Waller 1997: 378f.).  
17  See above, footnotes 12 and 13. 
18  European Court of Justice, Case 327/91 France v. Commission [1994] E.C.R. 3666. 
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and EU authorities were framed differently, i.e. as non-binding ‘arrangements’ or ‘best 
practice guidelines’ which did not require Council approval.  
Individual cases also show the autonomy enhancing effects of cooperation between 
competition authorities and, vice-versa, the increase of political interventions in cases of 
conflict. In Worldcom/MCI in 1998, for example, the European Commission and the US 
DoJ tightly coordinated their investigations and were able to jointly enforce strict reme-
dies before the merger could be executed.19 In MCI Worldcom/Sprint in 2000, both the 
EU Commission and the US DoJ reached the same conclusion to prohibit the merger 
which would have created one of the world’s largest telecoms firms.20 The decision of 
the EU Commission received harsh criticism from some US senators who tried to retali-
ate by blocking foreign acquisitions of US telecom. Eventually, however, cooperation 
between competition authorities increased their autonomy from political intervention: 
“Ironically, while both U.S. and European regulators agreed that the Sprint-WorldCom 
deal was simply too big, it’s the politicians who have bridled at the merger’s rejection” 
(Bodony and Krapf 2000). Another telling example is the permitted takeover of People-
soft by Oracle (both US software companies), in which close cooperation among them 
led US and EU authorities to reach the same conclusion – despite theoretical and meth-
odological differences (Vinje and Paemen 2006: 22).21 The EU Commission largely 
synchronized its own investigations with those of the US DoJ and, in its final decision, 
referred to evidence from the US trial. In the recent Google/Doubleclick merger, politi-
cians and non-governmental organizations voiced strong concerns as regards privacy 
protection. Even the European Parliament, usually no player in competition control, 
discussed the question whether competition authorities should consider privacy con-
cerns in their assessment.22 The Commission as well as the US FTC, however, referred 
these broader concerns to the legislature and allowed the merger on the basis of a – 
largely identical – pure competition analysis.23 
                                                 
19  Case M.1069, O.J. L 116 (1999). In order to receive EU and US approval for the merger, Worldcom had to sell 
its internet services. See also: “MCI to Sell Wholesale Internet Unit to Cable and Wireless”, NY Times 
(29.5.1998).  
20  Case M. 1741, O.J. L 300 (2003). 
21  Case M.3216, O.J. L 218 (2005). See also: “Merger control: Main developments between 1 September and 
31 December 2004”, Competition Policy Newsletter (Spring 2005), p. 74f. 
22  See „Google spars with European lawmakers over privacy”, Reuters (21.1.2008), online: http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/internetNews/idUSL215785220080121?rpc=28 [last checked: 30.7.2009]. 
23  Case M.4731, decision no yet published in the Official Journal. See also: “Google/DoubleClick: The first test for 
the Commission’s non-horizontal merger guidelines”, Competition Policy Newsletter (Summer 2008), p. 53-60.  
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The few cases of conflict between EU and US competition authorities, by contrast, 
were characterized by high levels of politicization. While the conflicts were partly 
caused by political intervention, conflicting approaches of competition authorities also 
provided opportunity structures for further intervention. In Aérsopatiale/de Havilland, 
the European Commission’s first merger prohibition in 1991, Commissioner Sir Leon 
Brittain asserted himself against US and Canadian authorities that had previously al-
lowed the merger, mainly for industrial policy reasons (Klodt 2001: 885).24 Neverthe-
less, the decision-making process within the Commission exhibited a deep cleavage 
between those advocating a strict application of European competition rules and others, 
foremost DG Industry as well as the French and Italian Commissioners, supporting the 
merger for domestic industrial policy and employment considerations (Cini and 
McGowan 2009: 154f.). Although DG Comp prevailed in the individual case, the 
Commission’s reputation for stringent competition policy was clearly damaged (Wilks 
and McGowan 1995). In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the EU Commission threatened to 
prohibit the merger of two US companies that had been permitted by the US FTC in 
early July 1997.25 In response, US politicians pressured the EU Commission: US Presi-
dent Clinton considered a WTO complaint, US Congress condemned the EU’s ‘unwar-
ranted interference’, and, finally, the Commission tied its merger approval to a package 
of remedies offered by Boeing (Damro and Guay 2009: 17f.). While the Commission’s 
insistence in this individual case certainly helped to establish itself as a global competi-
tion player (Damro 2001), both US and EU competition authorities soon realized that 
repeated conflicts would undermine their credibility in the long run (Damro and Guay 
2009: 19). In 2001, the Commission took its first decision to block a merger of two US 
companies –General Electric and Honeywell – that had already been allowed by the US 
DoJ.26 Once again, the Commission reaffirmed its global role, but none of the competi-
tion authorities involved remained without damage to its image. Both sides were ac-
cused of being influenced by protectionist domestic industrial interests and flawed com-
petition analyses (Fox 2007; Klodt 2005: 54).  
To summarize, conflict prevention between EU and US competition authorities re-
duces the likelihood of political intervention and, thus, increases the autonomy of com-
petition control. If conflicts cannot be prevented, however, they have to be solved and 
this is usually the task of judges. 
                                                 
24  Case M.53, O.J. C 128 (1991). 
25  Case M.887, O.J. C 59 (1997). 
26  Case M.2220, O.J. C 46 (2001). 
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Autonomy from judges 
Next to competition authorities, courts are clearly the most important players in compe-
tition control, albeit with very different functions in the US and in the EU. In the US, 
competition authorities investigate and enforce, but courts have the final say in estab-
lishing whether a firm’s behaviour is classified as anti-competitive (Waller 1994: 588f.). 
In the EU, the Commission does not only investigate and enforce competition rules; it 
also takes the final decisions. These decisions can be challenged in court, but most of 
the time, the ECJ has been a major ally of the Commission in expanding European 
competition control, e.g. when it found that existing Treaty rules authorized the Com-
mission to control mergers and, thus, paved the way for the first European merger regu-
lation (Cini and McGowan 2009: 128-131).27  
In many respects, therefore, competition authorities cannot be autonomous from 
judges and there is also no perceived need for more autonomy as courts are usually not 
regarded as pursuing an independent competition or industrial policy agenda. With re-
spect to extraterritoriality, however, the jurisprudence’s contribution remains largely 
inconclusive until today. In his very detailed study, Dlouhy (2003) discusses decades of 
judicial efforts to define the scope of US and EU extraterritorial jurisdiction in competi-
tion law. For example, innumerable qualifications of the effects doctrine have been 
made, but no standard could be agreed upon: anticompetitive behaviour should be in-
tended or not; it should have ‘some effect’, ‘any effect’, an ‘appreciable effect’, a ‘sub-
stantial effect’, a ‘direct and substantial effect’ or a ‘direct and influencing effect’ (ibid.: 
69-73). Dlouhy (ibid: 139, own translation) concludes: “Every US courts seems to apply 
more or less different criteria. Any attempt to establish a commonly agreed effects test 
ultimately failed”. Moreover, as was discussed above, EU and US competition authori-
ties try to prevent conflicts between overlapping jurisdictions rather than dissolving the 
overlap – but once a dispute has reached the courts, it is often too late for strategies of 
conflict prevention. Judicial efforts to include comity considerations in competition ju-
risdiction remain equally inconclusive. While the ECJ is largely silent on the matter, US 
courts oscillate between very restrictive interpretations of comity as in Hartford Fire 
and broader considerations as in Empagram: “Comity is not a matter of rigid obligation, 
but, rather, a protean concept of jurisdictional respect. And to complicate matters, com-
ity, like beauty, sometimes is in the eye of the beholder” (cited in Späth 2006).  
As a consequence, efforts to control the impact of extraterritoriality and to include 
comity considerations into competition analysis have not been given up, but EU and US 
competition authorities try to tackle these questions cooperatively before they reach the 
                                                 
27  European Court of Justice, Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, BAT&Reynolds v. Commission [1987] E.C.R. 4487. 
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courts. Referring to guidelines of the US DoJ from 1988 on the extraterritorial applica-
tion of US competition law, Damro (2006a: 45) argues: 
“From the perspective of the US competition authorities, judges are ill-suited 
for determining extraterritorial jurisdiction. (…) Rather the competition regula-
tors only feel comfortable with ‘intergovernmental consultation and negotiation’ 
which explicitly means the executive branch and implicitly means the agencies 
responsible for implementing competition policy. Thus, while comity-like inter-
est-balancing might be permitted in determining extraterritorial jurisdiction, the 
DoJ guidelines make it clear that any interest-balancing should be conducted 
under the discretion of the competition regulators, not the courts or legislature. 
This position is reflected in the EU-US Bilateral Agreement and Positive Comity 
Agreements.”  
The bilateral EU and US cooperation agreements on competition use very prudent lan-
guage in order to signal that they do not redefine the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and/or comity and, thus, that they do not challenge legislative and judicial authorities: 
“Nothing in this Article limits the discretion of the notified Party under its competition 
laws” and “Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with 
the existing laws, or as requiring any change in the laws” of the US, the EU or its Mem-
ber states.28 Yet, by rendering questions of jurisdictional overlap and the limits of extra-
territoriality less salient, they ultimately aim at increasing the autonomy of competition 
authorities from jurisprudence.  
According to official justifications, the 1998 Agreement on Positive Comity shall re-
duce cases of extraterritorial competition control and, thus, could be interpreted as an 
attempt to substitute expansionist jurisprudence on extraterritoriality by a more deferen-
tial approach through EU and US competition authorities (Damro 2006a: 122f.). Quite 
to the contrary, however, the agreement leaves the fundamental issue of jurisdiction 
largely untouched while practically creating new opportunities for US and EU authori-
ties to enforce their competition laws (Dlouhy 2003: 233-235). In its ‘Antitrust en-
forcement guidelines for international operations’, the US DoJ describes several hypo-
thetical situations under which it would consider a positive comity request.29 For exam-
ple, the DoJ could request the European Commission to investigate an international car-
tel for which US authorities lack jurisdiction because it impacts only indirectly on the 
US market. The only formal positive comity request on the basis of the 1998 Agreement 
so far concerned an anticompetitive conduct on European territory for which US au-
                                                 
28  Articles V and IX and of the 1991 Agreement and Article VII of the 1998 Agreement.  
29  See sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the guidelines, online: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm [Last 
checked: 31.07.2009]. 
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thorities lacked enforcement capacities and ‘deferral’ to the EU Commission was seen 
as the more promising option (Baetge 2009: 383). 
To sum up, courts play an important role in competition control and the extraterrito-
riality of US and EU competition law was established by judges. As to the overlap of 
competition jurisdictions, however, jurisprudence remains inconclusive and, at least as a 
side-effect, the strategy of conflict prevention practiced by EU and US competition au-
thorities diminishes the influence of the judiciary.   
Autonomy from firms  
Finally, competition authorities depend on close cooperation with industry, e.g. when 
firms provide information about ongoing or potential investigations and when remedies 
are negotiated in merger review (cf. Cini and McGowan 2009: 156). Given its immense 
workload, the Commission has an interest in reaching consensus with the enterprises 
involved and in pre-empting anticompetitive behaviour from the beginning rather than 
fighting too many conflicts at the same time.30 If firms publicly pressure competition 
authorities, however, the credibility of competition control gets undermined. All cases 
of transatlantic conflict in competition control involved such attempts to put pressure on 
EU and/or US competition authorities.  
In the forefront of the Commission’s GE/Honeywell decision (cf. Fox 2007; Damro 
and Guay 2009), for example, GE chief executive John F. Welch publicly criticized the 
Commission’s investigations: “The European regulators’ demands exceeded anything I 
or our European advisers imagined, and differed sharply from antitrust counterparts in 
the U.S. and Canada.”31 Moreover, GE tried to put pressure on the Commission by lob-
bying American politicians: “We thought it would be impossible that the Europeans 
would try to block a U.S.-U.S. deal that had been given the go-ahead by Washington 
(…) The conventional wisdom was that the political pressure would be too great.”32 In 
reaction, the European Commission needed to be strict in order to show its political in-
dependence: “Of course, political pressure can help, but not when it’s done publicly 
(…) [The Commission] cannot be seen to be bowing to political pressure, so if anything 
this has only harmed the deal’s chances.”33  
As an individual case, GE/Honeywell clearly helped to demonstrate the Commis-
sion’s autonomy rather than undermining it. In general, however, repeated conflicts 
with firms and US authorities would soon overstrain the Commission’s enforcement 
                                                 
30  For example, while the Commission had prohibited 20 mergers until the end of 2008, firms withdrew their 
merger proposals in 33 cases before such a decision became necessary. See also footnote 9.   
31  See “G.E. Purchase Of Honeywell Now Appears Near Collapse”, New York Times, 15 June 2001. 
32  See “Failure to Acquire Honeywell Is Sour Finish for G.E. Chief”, New York Times, 3 July 2001. 
33  See above, footnote 31. 
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capacities and decrease the credibility of its competition analysis. Moreover, divergent 
approaches between EU and US authorities would also encourage ‘forum shopping’ on 
the part of firms complaining about their competitors. On the one hand, as one could 
observe in the Empagran case, US competition control is particularly attractive for 
competitors trying to sue for high compensations (‘treble damages’, cf. Waller 1994: 
588f.). On the other hand, complainants that do not see great chances too succeed in US 
courts might prefer the European Commission’s strict approach in the GE/Honeywell 
merger or in its antitrust investigations against Microsoft.34 Systematic forum shopping 
in competition control, however, would lead to a typical prisoner’s dilemma in which 
each individual firm has an interest in strict control for all others and no restrictions for 
itself (Kerber and Budzinski 2004: 50). Moreover, if forum shopping increases, compe-
tition authorities at least partly lose their control on the cases to deal with and on the 
information they receive.  
Cooperation among competition authorities does not remove the need for them to 
also coordinate with firms, but it strengthens the authorities’ role in setting the rules 
during this coordination process. For example, in cases in which firms are represented 
by different lawyers in the EU and in the US, Parisi (1999: 141) strongly recommends 
firms to build “as much co-operation and co-ordination between its lawyers as between 
the reviewing authorities”. Similarly, in order not to complicate parallel investigations 
and to avoid delays, firms need to notify synchronously to both authorities and facilitate 
information exchange through waiving their confidentiality rights. Finally, as earlier 
examples have shown, transatlantic cooperation enables competition authorities to im-
pose strict conditions where these are deemed necessary (MCI/Worldcom) and to resist 
firm lobbying against negative decisions (Worldcom MCI/Sprint).  
CONCLUSION  
This article started out with a general overview on the governance of overlapping juris-
dictions and introduced the more specific problem of horizontal overlap in competition 
control. Due to the fact that US as well as EU authorities apply their competition rules 
extraterritorially, significant potential for horizontal judicial overlap exists. Yet, apart 
from some high profile conflicts that have attracted great public interest, most competi-
tion decisions are taken separately but complementary by US and EU competition au-
thorities. Two main insights can be derived from the case of competition control and 
both aspects would clearly benefit from further research, including comparison with 
other policy fields. Being a frontrunner in international legalization, the field of compe-
tition policy is particularly interesting for studying the governance of overlapping juris-
dictions, but one has to be cautious in generalizing from this field. 
                                                 
34  See, for example, “U.S. Businesses Turn to Europe To Bar Mergers”, New York Times, 19 June 2001. 
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First, strategies of conflict prevention rather than conflict solution prevail in most 
cases of transatlantic judicial overlap in competition control. Given the increasing com-
plexity of international legalization and the absence of a hierarchical system of dispute 
settlement (comparable e.g. to the ECJ), preventing conflicts seems to be more feasible 
than any attempt to clearly re-define borders between jurisdictions. Transgovernmental 
networks as described forcefully by Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) play a key role in 
preventing conflicts in the case at hand. In order to assess more generally the impor-
tance and the effectiveness of this ‘new world order’, however, one would have to go 
beyond competition policy and ask: (Why) Do we find strategies of conflict prevention 
dominant in some policy fields and strategies of conflict solution in others? Under what 
conditions should we expect conflict prevention to be effective? 
Second, apart from effectively preventing conflicts between jurisdictions, transgov-
ernmental cooperation may also serve the self-interest of the institutions involved. 
Transatlantic cooperation, it has been argued, increases the autonomy of US and EU 
competition authorities from politics, judges, and firms. Political intervention is largely 
seen as an obstacle to effective competition control and, thus, more autonomy of com-
petition authorities helps to privilege the goal of competition over other policy goals. In 
addition, cooperation strengthens the position of competition authorities in their interac-
tion with courts and firms. These political implications deserve attention when investi-
gating the governance of overlapping jurisdictions. Extending the analysis beyond com-
petition policy, one would, therefore, have to ask: Who benefits from cooperation in 
transgovernmental networks? What are the implications for the different policy goals 
involved? 
The argument put forward in this article builds on transgovernmentalist approaches 
and stresses the relevance of administrative networks in effectively preventing jurisdic-
tional conflicts. In pointing to the political implications of network cooperation, how-
ever, it adds a more critical notion. Independence of competition authorities may im-
prove the effectiveness of competition control, but competition is just one policy goal 
among others. If other policies, which are affected by competition control, do not lend 
themselves equally well for transgovernmental cooperation, their goals may be disad-
vantaged. Moreover, such an asymmetry between policy goals would not result from a 
deliberate political choice, but rather from the de-politicisation of potential conflicts 
between overlapping jurisdictions. 
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